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Edwards v. Arizona, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981).
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 13, 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States handed
down its controversial decision in Miranda v. An'zona I and introduced the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination 2 as constitutional
authority for the regulation of police conduct. Although the basis of the
Court's decision in Miranda was somewhat uncertain,3 the majority opin-
ion explicitly described the procedures that the police were to follow
before subjecting a suspect to "custodial interrogation" 4 :
[A suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any ques-
tioning if he so desires.
5
The Court held that these four warnings were necessary to counteract
the potential for compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation and to
protect an individual's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself...." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
3 The majority opinion in Miranda suggests two rationales for the decision: that custodial
interrogation is inherently compelling, 384 U.S. at 458, 467, 468, 478; and that warnings are
necessary as "prophylactic safeguards" to counteract the potential for compulsion inherent in
custodial interrogation. Id at 457. The Burger Court's decision in Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433 (1974), effectively overruled the "inherent compulsion" rationale. In Tucker, the
Court explicitly emphasized that violations of Miranda are not necessarily violations of the
fifth amendment. Id at 444. Although the Burger Court has reluctantly accepted the "pro-
phylactic safeguard" rationale, that approach has a limited impact on the regulation of police
conduct. Because the violation of a "prophylactic safeguard" does not entail the violation of
a constitutional right, police conduct may transgress the dictates of Miranda without requiring
the reversal of a subsequent conviction. For a discussion of these two rationales, see Grano,
Rhode Island v. Innis.- A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises Underl ying the Law of Confes-
sions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 42 (1979).
4 The Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444.
5 Id at 479.
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tion.6 The Court required that all evidence obtained in violation of
these rules be excluded at trial.
7
Although the Miranda decision established that the fifth amend-
ment authorizes an individual to invoke either the right to remain silent
or the right to counsel, the justices also contemplated a waiver of those
rights.8 Unfortunately, the passages in the majority opinion outlining
the characteristics of a valid waiver of fifth amendment rights are not
entirely clear. Last term, the Court had the opportunity to clarify the
standard of waiver required before the authorities may subject an indi-
vidual who has invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel to custo-
dial interrogation.
In Edwards v. Arizona,9 the Court held that once a suspect has in-
voked his fifth amendment right to counsel, a showing only that the
suspect responded to subsequent police-initiated custodial interrogation
cannot establish a valid waiver of that right.' 0 This limitation applies
even if the police advise a suspect of his rights prior to the subsequent
interogation. 1' In addition, the Court held that once a suspect has in-
voked his fifth amendment right to counsel, the police cannot subject
him to custodial interrogation prior to the appointment of an attorney.
12
An exception is made, however, in the event that the suspect initiates
further contact with the police. In that situation, subsequent custodial
interrogation is permitted if there has been a "knowing and intelligent"
waiver of the right to counsel under the "totality of the circum-
stances."' 3 As this exception indicates, Edwards represents yet another
attempt by the Burger Court to limit the impact of Miranda and avoid
the establishment of per se exclusionary rules.14 Unfortunately, the de-
cision also exemplifies the Burger Court's failure to implement the ra-
tionale of Miranda and to provide "concrete constitutional guidelines for
6 Id at 467, 478-79.
7 Id at 444, 478-79.
8 Id at 444, 475. The Court emphasized that "a heavy burden rests on the government
to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against
self-incrimination. ... ." Id at 475.
9 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981).
10 id at 1884.
11 Id
12 Id at 1885. As used in this Note, the "appointment" of an attorney includes the oppor-
tunity to confer with counsel and to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.
13 Id at 1885 n.9. The concept of a "knowing and intelligent" waiver under the "totality
of the circumstances" is outlined in note 61 infra.
14 See Grossman & Lane, Afirandak The Erosion ofa Doctrine, 62 CHI. B. REc. 250, 264
(1981). See notes 68-74 & accompanying text infra. See also Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the
Burger Court, 1977 Sup. Cr. REv. 99; Comment, Miranda v. Arizona: The Emerging Pattern, 12 U.
RICHMOND L. REv. 409 (1978); Comment, Michigan v. Mosly: A Further Erosion of Miranda?,
13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 861 (1976); Comment, The Declining Miranda Doctrine: The Supreme
Court's Development ofMiranda Issues, 36 WASH. AND LEE L. RE v. 259 (1979).
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law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." 15 Moreover, it is un-
likely that the principles outlined in the majority opinion will ade-
quately protect an individual's fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination when a court confronts a difficult fact situation.1
6
II. EDWARDS V. ARIZONA
On January 19, 1976, a sworn complaint was filed against Robert
Edwards in Arizona state court charging him with robbery, burglary,
and first degree murder.1 7 An arrest warrant was issued pursuant to the
complaint and the police arrested Edwards at his home later that same
day. They took him to the police station and informed him of his rights
as required by Miranda v. Arizona.18 Edwards indicated that he under-
stood his rights and that he was willing to submit to questioning. After
the police told him that another suspect already in custody had impli-
cated him in the crime, Edwards denied involvement and gave a taped
statement presenting an alibi defense. He then sought to "make a deal"
with the interrogating officer. The officer informed Edwards that he
wanted a statement but that he did not have the authority to negotiate a
deal. The officer then provided Edwards with the number of the county
attorney, with whom Edwards spoke briefly. Following his conversation
with the attorney, Edwards said, "I want an attorney before making a
deal." At that point, all questioning ceased and the police took Edwards
to the county jail.
On January 20, 1976, two detectives came to the county jail and
asked to see Edwards. This visit occurred at 9:15 in the morning and
Edwards was scheduled to receive counsel at 1:30 that afternoon. 19
When the detention officer informed Edwards that the detectives
wanted to speak with him, Edwards replied that he did not want to talk
15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Miranda to develop "concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." 384 U.S. at 441-42. The Court
had been unable to articulate a clear and predictable definition of "voluntariness."
16 Edwards v. Arizona did not present the Court with a difficult fact situation. The authori-
ties initiated contact with and interrogated an unwilling suspect, the suspect's statements
indicated that he did not understand the implications of his responses, the purpose of the
interrogation was to expedite a conviction rather than to gather evidence essential to the
solution of a crime, and the authorities scheduled their interrogation to occur only a few
hours before the appointment of counsel. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell, joined by
Justice Rehnquist, noted that "few cases will be as clear as this one." 101 S. Ct. at 1888
(Powell, J., concurring).
17 The facts stated in the text are for the most part taken from the opinions of the Arizona
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United States.
18 See note 5 & accompanying text supra.
19 Brief for Petitioner at 6, Edwards v. Arizona, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981). In Arizona, indi-
viduals arrested on warrants issued upon a felony complaint are brought before a magistrate.
At that time, individuals who cannot afford an attorney receive court-appointed counsel.
Edwards' appearance before a magistrate was scheduled for January 20, 1976, at 1:30 p.m.
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to anyone. The detention officer told him that he "had to" and took
him to meet with the detectives. The detectives identified themselves to
Edwards, stated that they wanted to speak with him, and informed him
of his Miranda rights. Edwards indicated that he was willing to talk, but
that he first wanted to hear the taped statement of the alleged accom-
plice who had implicated him in the crime. After listening to the tape
for several minutes, Edwards said that he would make a statement but
that he did not want it to be tape recorded. The detectives explained
that they could testify in court as to his oral statements, but Edwards
said, "I'll tell you anything you want to know, but I don't want it on
tape." Edwards then gave a statement implicating himself in the crime.
Before trial, Edwards moved to suppress his confession on the
ground that the detectives violated his Miranda rights when they sub-
jected him to custodial interrogation after he had-invoked his right to
counsel. The trial court initially granted the motion to suppress, but
reversed its ruling when presented with a supposedly controlling deci-
sion of a higher Arizona court.20 The trial court stated without explana-
tion that it found Edwards' statement to be voluntary. Edwards was
tried twice and convicted, with evidence of his confession being admit-
ted at both trials.
2 1
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
decision.2 2 The court held that Edwards had invoked his fifth amend-
ment right to counsel during the custodial interrogation conducted on
the night of January 19,23 but that he had voluntarily waived any con-
stitutional safeguards prior to the custodial interrogation conducted the
next morning.2 4 The court reasoned that Miranda did not create a per se
rule against a waiver of the fifth amendment right to counsel once that
right has been invoked 25 and that the trial court was to answer the ques-
tion of waiver in a decision guided "by the rules for determining volun-
tariness."'26 The court concluded that reading Miranda to create a per se
rule would preclude a defendant from acting in his own best interests
20 State v. Travis, 26 Ariz. App. 24, 545 P.2d 986 (1976).
21 The jury in the first trial was unable to reach a verdict.
22 State v. Edwards, 122 Ariz. 206, 594 P.2d 72 (1979). Edwards was sentenced pursuant
to portions of A.R.S. § 13-454 which the Supreme Court of Arizona had held unconstitu-
tional in State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924
(1979). For this reason, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in part and remanded for
resentencing in part.
23 The State disputed this issue. Id at 211,594 P.2d at 77. The court held that although
Edwards' statement was equivocal, it was to be interpreted "as a request for counsel and as a
request to remain silent until counsel was present." Id
24 Id at 212, 594 P.2d at 78.
25 Id at 211, 594 P.2d at 77.
26 Id at 212, 594 P.2d at 78.
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and would" 'imprison a man in his privileges.' ",27 Because there was no
evidence of clear and manifest error, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld
the trial court's finding that "the waiver and confession were voluntarily
and knowingly made ... .
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of
the Arizona Supreme Court and held that the use of Edwards' confes-
sion at trial constituted a violation of his rights under the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. 29 The majority opinion, authored by Justice
White, cited two reasons for this reversal. First, the Court noted that
waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute
an understanding and intelligent relinquishment of a known right.
30
Because the trial court had only focused upon the voluntariness of Ed-
wards' alleged waiver and confession, there was no showing of a know-
ing and intelligent waiver of the fifth amendment right to counsel.3 '
Therefore, the Arizona Supreme Court incorrectly rejected Edwards'
motion to suppress his confession. Second, the Court reasoned that ad-
ditional safeguards are necessary when an individual has invoked the
fifth amendment right to counsel. 32 Examining a number of recent
Supreme Court decisions, the Court emphasized that "it is inconsistent
with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to
reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to
counsel."133 Because the authorities had reinterrogated Edwards in cus-
tody at their instance, use of the resulting confession at trial constituted
a violation of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Although the Supreme Court suppressed the use of Edwards' con-
fession at trial, the majority refused to interpret Miranda as eliminating
the possibility of waiver once an individual has invoked his fifth amend-
ment right to counsel. Instead, the Court focused only upon the impli-
cations of police-initiated custodial interrogation. In a footnote, the
majority opinion provided that an individual who has invoked his fifth
amendment right to counsel may subsequently waive that right if he
initiates contact with the authorities.34
Near the end of the majority opinion, the Court emphasized that
an individual who has invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel has
27 Id at 211, 594 P.2d at 77 (quoting Adams v. United States cx rel McCann, 317 U.S.
269, 280 (1942)).
28 Id at 212, 594 P.2d at 78.
29 101 S. Ct. at 1882.
30 Id at 1883.
3' Id at 1884.
32 Id
33 Id at 1885.
34 Id at 1885 n.9.
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an "undisputed right" to be free from custodial interrogation.35 It is
puzzling, therefore, that the majority opinion provided for the forfeiture
of this "undisputed right" in the following paragraph. The Court did
not directly explain the reasons for this exception, but did note that
nothing in the fifth amendment prohibits the police from merely listen-
ing to a suspect's volunteered statements and using them against him at
trial.36 Working from that premise, the Court seemed to make two as-
sumptions. First, the Court assumed that an individual who initiates
contact with the authorities is likely to be doing so in order to volunteer
a statement.37 Second, the Court assumed that the giving of a volun-
teered statement is likely to involve some amount of custodial interroga-
tion and that this custodial interrogation is sometimes appropriate. 38
The Court concluded that custodial interrogation is permitted if an in-
dividual has initiated contact with the authorities and there has been a
knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel under the totality
of the circumstances. 39 The majority opinion emphasized that the ex-
amination of waiver must include the "necessary fact" that the suspect
initiated contact with the police. 4°
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger agreed that the Court
should suppress Edwards' confession, but objected to the majority's
"special rule as to how an accused in custody may waive the right to be
free from interrogation."'41 The Chief Justice argued that the holding of
Miranda, as distinguished from its dicta, did not affect the traditional
standard for determining whether there has been a valid waiver of the
right to counsel. 42 He concluded that the detention officer's statement
to Edwards that Edwards "had to" talk to the detectives demonstrated
that the resumption of interrogation was not voluntary and that there
35 Id at 1885.
36 Id The procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required only when the authori-
ties subject an individual to police interrogation in custodial surroundings. Because custodial
interrogation does not occur when the authorities merely listen to an individual's volunteered
statements, there is no potential for compulsion and fifth amendment rights do not attach.
37 Although the Court does not actually articulate this assumption it is difficult to under-
stand how the majority could otherwise justify the selection of suspect-initiated contact as the
point at which an individual forfeits his absolute protection from custodial interrogation.
Unless an individual who initiates contact with the authorities does so more often than not in
order to volunteer a statement, the Court's emphasis on "initiation" is misplaced. The consti-
tutional safeguards outlined in Miranda were designed to prevent the admission of involuntary
statements rather than to insure that no voluntary statements were excluded. See note 92 &
accompanying text infa.
38 101 S. Ct. at 1885 n.9.
39 Id
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had not been a knowing and intelligent waiver.43
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Justice
Rehnquist, agreed that the Court should suppress Edwards' confession,
but expressed uncertainty as to the meaning of the majority opinion.
44
Discussing the majority's emphasis on "initiation," Justice Powell feared
that the Court's opinion might create "a new per se rule, requiring a
threshold inquiry as to precisely who opened any conversation between
an accused and state officials. . . -45 He insisted that such a rule
would "superimpose a new element of proof on the established doctrine
of waiver of counsel" and frustrate legitimate communications between
an individual and the authorities.46 Justice Powell would treat "initia-
tion" as only one of many circumstances that are relevant to the ques-
tion of whether there has been an understanding and intelligent
relinquishment of a known right.
4 7
III. "SECOND LEVEL" PROTECTIONS AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Although a waiver of constitutional rights must always be knowing
and intelligent, 48 additional requirements must be met under certain
circumstances. Edwards v. Arizona is important because it presented the
Court with two such circumstances. First, the case concerned the stan-
dard of waiver to be employed once an individual has invoked his fifth
amendment rights. Second, the case involved the invocation of the fifth
amendment right to counsel as opposed to the fifth amendment right to
remain silent.
If an individual does not invoke his fifth amendment rights, a court
may find that he implicitly waived them.49 A decision to remain silent
or to be represented by counsel, however, triggers "second level" Mi-
randa protections and places additional restrictions on police conduct.50
Consequently, the standard employed to determine whether there has
been a valid waiver of fifth amendment rights is stricter once an individ-
ual has asserted those rights.
43 Id at 1887 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
44 Id (Powell, J., concurring).
45 Id
46 Id
47 Id at 1888 (Powell, J., concurring).
48 See, e.g., Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470 (1980); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S.
707, 725 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979); Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458,464 (1938).
49 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).
50 The reference to "second level" Miranda protections is taken from People v. Grant, 45
N.Y.2d 366, 372, 380 N.E.2d 257, 260, 408 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432 (1978). These protections are
discussed in White, Rhode Island . Inni: The Signifxance ofa Suspeats Assertion ofHis Right to
Counsel, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 63 (1979).
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In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court discussed the implications
of "second level" protections. Near the beginning of the majority opin-
ion, Chief Justice Warren addressed the question of waiver:
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver
is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates
in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult
with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if
the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish
to be interrogated, the police may not question him.51
This passage illustrates that additional protections follow from an invo-
cation of fifth amendment rights.
In Michigan v. Mosley, 52 the Supreme Court examined the "second
51 384 U.S. at 444-45.
52 423 U.S. 96 (1975). InMoslq, the authorities arrested the defendant in connection with
a robbery and brought him to the police station for interrogation. After being given his
Miranda warnings, he indicated that he did not want to answer any questions about the
robbery and the interrogation ceased. Approximately two hours later, however, a different
officer took the defendant to a different office to interrogate him about a homicide. After
again being given his Miranda warnings, the defendant made statements implicating himself
in the homicide. These statements were used against him at trial, and he was convicted of
first degree murder.
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that "Miranda cannot
be circumvented by the simple expedient of shuttling a person from one police officer to
another for purposes of questioning. . . ." People v. Mosley, 51 Mich. App. 105, 108, 214
N.W.2d 564, 566 (1974). The Supreme Court reversed.
A passage from the majority opinion in Miranda controlled the question represented in
Afoslq:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual
indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to
remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to
exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his
privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without
the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the
individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been
once invoked.
384 U.S. at 473-74. Unfortunately, Miranda did not indicate the circumstances, if any, in
which the authorities might resume interrogation once an individual has invoked his fifth
amendment right to remain silent.
The Mosl/q Court noted that it could interpret Miranda to require either a per se rule
against subsequent custodial interrogation or only the immediate cessation of custodial inter-
rogation and a momentary respite. The majority opinion rejected both of these extremes as
"absurd and unintended." 423 U.S. at 102. The Court reasoned that permanent immunity
from custodial interrogation would "transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational
obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to
make informed and intelligent assessments of their interests." Id At the same time, the
Court reasoned that the continuation of custodial interrogation after only a momentary cessa-
tion would "frustrate the purposes of Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to
undermine the will of the person being questioned." Id The Court held that the admissibil-
ity of statements obtained through the custodial interrogation of an individual who has in-
voked his fifth amendment right to remain silent depends upon whether the individual's
"right to cut off questioning" has been "scrupulously honored." Id at 104.
In holding that the police had "scrupulously honored" the defendant's "right to cut off
12951981]
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level" protections required when an individual has invoked his fifth
amendment right to remain silent. The Court held that once an indi-
vidual has asserted his right to remain silent, the admissability of state-
ments subsequently obtained depends upon whether the individual's
"right to cut off questioning" has been "scrupulously honored." 53 Al-
though the majority opinion in Mosley establishes that an individual
who has invoked his right to remain silent may implicitly waive that
right by subsequently responding to custodial interrogation, the decision
suggests that a court must automatically exclude statements obtained
within an unspecified period of time after the initial invocation of the
right.54 This protection is not provided to individuals who have not as-
serted their fifth amendment rights.
Although the invocation of either fifth amendment right triggers
"second level" Miranda protections, those protections are greater when
an individual has invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel. In Mi-
randa, the Supreme Court outlined the procedure to be followed once
the authorities have given an individual the four protective warnings: 55
If the individual indicates in any manner ... that he wishes to remain
silent, the interrogation must cease .... If the individual states that he
wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is pres-
ent. At that time the individual must have an opportunity to confer with
the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent
questioning.
5 6
Although custodial interrogation "must cease" following a decision to
remain silent, custodial interrogation "must cease until an attorney is
present" following a decision to be represented by counsel. This qualifi-
cation indicates that an invocation of the fifth amendment right to
questioning" in Mosl, the Court emphasized that the police had promptly ceased the initial
interrogation, resumed interrogation only after the passage of a significant period of time,
given the defendant his Miranda warnings prior to the second interrogation, and restricted the
second interrogation to a crime that had not been the subject of the initial interrogation. Id
at 106. Unfortunately, the Court did not suggest which, if any, of these factors was crucial to
the determination of whether the defendant's fifth amendment right to remain silent had
been "scrupulously honored."
In a concurring opinion, Justice White argued that the police should be allowed to sub-
ject an individual who has invoked his fifth amendment right to remain silent to custodial
interrogation after only a momentary respite and use any voluntary statements subsequently
obtained. Id at 107 (White, J., concurring). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joined
by Justice Marshall, reasoned that the police should not be allowed to subject an individual
who has invoked his fifth amendment right to remain silent to custodial interrogation until
the appointment of counsel. Id at 116 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority opinion indi-
rectly labelled Justice White's position "absurd" but failed to address the alternative sug-
gested by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall.
53 Id at 104.
54 Id at 107 (White, J., concurring).
55 See note 5 & accompanying text supra.
56 384 U.S. at 473-74.
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counsel restricts police conduct to a greater extent than an invocation of
the fifth amendment right to remain silent. Moreover, it suggests that
once an individual has invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel, the
authorities may not subject him to custodial interrogation prior to the
appointment of an attorney.
In Michigan v. Moslqy, the Court emphasized the importance of an
invocation of the fifth amendment right to counsel as opposed to the
fifth amendment right to remain silent. In the majority opinion, Justice
Stewart noted that Miranda "distinguished between the procedural safe-
guards triggered by a request to remain silent and a request for an attor-
ney. . .. ,,-7 In a concurring opinion, Justice White suggested some
reasons for this distinction:
It is sufficient to note that the reasons to keep the lines of communication
between the authorities and the accused open when the accused has chosen
to make his own decisions are not present when he indicates instead that
he wishes legal advice with respect thereto. The authorities may then com-
municate with him through an attorney. More to the point, the accused
having expressed his own view that he is not competent to deal with the
authorities without legal advice, a later decision at the authorities' insis-
tence to make a statement without counsel's presence may properly be
viewed with skepticism.58
Although the various opinions in Mosley indicated that the standard of
waiver would be stricter when the right at issue shifted from silence to
counsel, the majority of the justices gave no indication of what that stan-
dard would be.59
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court's earlier rulings by no means predetermined
the result reached by the Court in Edwards v. Ariona.60 Nevertheless, the
57 423 U.S. at 104, n.10.
58 Id at 110, n.2 (White, J., concurring).
59 In Mos/l, the Court emphasized that the case did not involve "the procedures to be
followed if the person in custody asks to consult with a lawyer. . . ." Id at 101, n.7. The
-Court noted that these procedures were outlined in the Miranda opinion. In a dissenting
opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshall (the only members of the Mosey Court who had
voted with the majority in Miranda) reasoned that the police should not be allowed to subject
an individual who has invoked his fifth amendment right to remain silent to custodial interro-
gation prior to the appointment of an attorney. Id at 116-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting). One
would have assumed that Justices Brennan and Marshall would have required equal if not
greater restrictions on police conduct once an individual has invoked his fifth amendment
right to counsel. Their alignment with the majority in Edwardr, however, reveals the inaccu-
racy of that assumption.
60 Because of the uncertainty that had surrounded the question presented in Edwards, the
courts of appeals produced conflicting opinions on the standard of waiver required once an
individual has invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel. A number of cases decided in
the Fourth Circuit established that an individual who has invoked his fifth amendment right
to counsel may subsequently waive that right. See, e.g., United States v. Grant, 549 F.2d 942
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majority opinion is a logical extension of the principles outlined in Mich-
igan v. Mosly and is consistent with the other Burger Court interpreta-
tions of Miranda v. Arizona. Unfortunately, the result of this consistency
is an unfounded construction of the language found in Miranda and an
inadequate application of the decision's rationale.
A number of Supreme Court decisions support the Court's position
that waivers of the right to counsel must not only be voluntary but must
also constitute an understanding and intelligent relinquishment of a
known right.61 The cases in which courts have applied this standard of
waiver, however, have involved waivers of the right to counsel when the
suspect has not invoked that right. As noted above, "second level" Mi-
randa protections require a stricter standard of waiver.62 The majority
opinion achieves this stricter standard by eliminating the possibility of a
valid waiver of the fifth amendment right to counsel during subsequent
police-initiated custodial interrogation.
The case law also supports the Court's emphasis on the importance
of the right to counsel63 and the majority opinion correctly cites Miranda
as requiring additional procedural safeguards when an individual has
invoked that right. 64 Working from the suggestion in Mosly that custo-
dial interrogation must cease for an unspecified period of time after an
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 908 (1977); United States v. Clark, 499 F.2d 802, 807 (4th Cir.
1974) (dictum). The Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits specifically re-
jected an unqualified per se rule against a valid waiver of the fifth amendment right to coun-
sel once that right has been invoked. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Fairman, 618 F.2d 1242, 1246 (7th
Cir. 1980); White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d 186, 192 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Rodri-
guez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978);
United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 367-68 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. deniedsub nom Inciso v.
United States, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977). The rule in the Fifth Circuit, however, prohibited a
finding of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel and restricted subsequent
custodial interrogationto the clarification of an equivocal invocation of that right. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 772 (5th Cir. 1979); Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513,
517 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979); United States v. Massey, 550 F.2d
300, 307 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Priest, 409 F.2d 491, 493 (5th Cir. 1969).
61 This standard of waiver was first established in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464:
A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right
to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances sur-
rounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.
Subsequent decisions have continued to apply this standard to determine whether there has
been a "knowing and intelligent" waiver under the "totality of the circumstances." See, e.g.,
Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. at 471; Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725; North Carolina v.
Butler, 441 U.S. at 373; Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 404; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at
835.
62 See notes 49-54 & accompanying text supra.
63 101 S. Ct. at 1885. The majority opinion cites the following cases: Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707; Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.
96; Id
64 See notes 55-59 & accompanying text sup ra.
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individual asserts his fifth amendment right to remain silent, the Court
in Edwards prohibits police-initiated custodial interrogation once an in-
dividual has invoked his right to counsel until an attorney has been ap-
pointed. Because the Court rejected a prohibition of custodial
interrogation in Mos/qy, 65 Edwards represents a conscious decision to ex-
tend additional procedural safeguards to an individual who has invoked
his fifth amendment right to counsel.
Despite the accusations of overreaching found in the concurring
opinions, 66 the majority opinion in Edwards reflects many of the princi-
ples that have become characteristic of Burger Court interpretations of
Miranda. In general, Supreme Court decisions in the past decade have
undermined the foundation of Miranda and moved towards the pre-Mi-
randa standard of voluntariness. 67 In cases decided since 1971, the Court
has permitted the use of Mfiranda-violative statements for impeachment
purposes,68 sanctioned police attempts to reinterrogate an individual
even though the individual has invoked his fifth amendment right to
remain silent, 69 and ruled that the procedural safeguards authorized by
Miranda do not apply to grand jury proceedings70 or to situations in
which the authorities have not placed an individual under "arrest. ' 71
65 The Court in Mosly refused to address the argument. To support this refusal, the
majority opinion incorrectly cited Miranda as requiring that "'the interrogation must cease
until an attorney is present' only '[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney.'" 423
U.S. at 104 n.10. By including the word "only," the Court distorted the meaning of the
original phrase and applied it to support an unintended result.
66 See note 80 & accompanying text supra.
67 See the articles cited in note 14 supra.
68 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). In Hasir, the police arrested the defendant
and subjected him to custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda. During the interroga-
tion, the defendant made several incriminating statements. The Supreme Court ruled that
these statements could not be used by the prosecution as part of its case in chief, but that they
could be used to impeach the defendant at trial. The Court reasoned that policy considera-
tions demanded that Miranda not be "perverted into a license to use perjury by way of de-
fense. . . ." Id at 226.
69 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96. See note 52 supra.
70 United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976). In Mandujano, the defendant was
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, at which point he was given incomplete Miranda
warnings. During the interrogation, the defendant perjured himself The Supreme Court
ruled that Miranda did not prohibit the use of this testimony. The Court reasoned that "the
Miranda Court simply did not perceive judicial inquiries and custodial interrogations as
equivalents...." Id at 579.
71 Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341
(1976). In Beck with, Internal Revenue Service agents interrogated the defendant at a private
home after giving him incomplete Miranda warnings. During the interrogation, the defendant
made several incriminating statements. The Supreme Court ruled that Miranda did not apply
because the defendant was neither arrested nor detained against his will. The Court reasoned
that Miranda was primarily concerned with "custody" rather than with the "coerciveness" of
a setting. 425 U.S. at 346.
In Mathiason, the police interrogated the defendant at the police station without giving
him Miranda warnings. The defendant had agreed to meet at the police station and was not
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At the same time, these and other decisions have established that Mi-
randa does not require the per se exclusion of evidence. In Michigan v.
Mosley, 72 North Carolina v. Butler,73 and Fare v. Michael C, 74 the Court
rejected per se exclusionary rules and instead applied a case by case,
totality of the circumstances approach. 75 Finally, the Court ruled last
term that for purposes of Miranda, "interrogation" includes any words
and actions on the part of the police that are "reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response" from a suspect. 76 Although this definition
seems to protect individuals from the potential for compulsion inherent
placed under arrest when he arrived there. During the interrogation, the defendant made
several incriminating statements. The Supreme Court ruled that Miranda did not apply be-
cause the defendant was not in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. The Court reasoned that "a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in
which Miranda applies simply because. . . the questioning took place in a 'coercive environ-
ment.'. . . Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a
person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.'" 429 U.S. at 495.
72 423 U.S. 96. See note 52 supra.
73 441 U.S. 369. In Butler, the police arrested the defendant in connection with a kidnap-
ping and gave him his Miranda warnings. The defendant stated that he understood the warn-
ings, but refused to sign a waiver of his rights. During custodial interrogation, the defendant
made several incriminating statements. The Supreme Court ruled that Miranda did not re-
quire an explicit waiver of fifth amendment rights and that the defendant's statements were
therefore admissible at trial. The Court reasoned that an inflexible per se rule went beyond
the requirements of federal law. Id at 376.
74 442 U.S. 707. In Fare, the police arrested the defendant in connection with a murder
and gave him his Miranda warnings. The defendant, a juvenile, stated that he understood the
warnings and that he wanted to speak with his probation officer. The police refused to call
the probation officer. After the defendant indicated that he would talk without an attorney,
the police subjected him to custodial interrogation. During the interrogation, the defendant
made several incriminating statements. The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant's re-
quest to speak with his probation officer was not an invocation of his fifth amendment right to
counsel and that his statements were therefore admissible at trial. The Court reasoned that a
probation officer "is not in the same posture with regard to either the accused or the system of
justice as a whole" as an attorney. Id at 719.
75 See Grossman & Lane, supra note 14, at 266. The totality of the circumstances ap-
proach is outlined in note 61 supra. This approach is identical to the pre-Miranda voluntari-
ness test and requires an examination of police conduct and the defendant's capabilities.
Because the "totality of the circumstances" test depends upon the facts of a particular case,
the approach introduces the subjectivity which Miranda sought to eliminate.
76 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. In Innis, the police arrested the defendant in
connection with several robberies that had been committed by a man armed with a sawed-off
shotgun. The defendant was not armed when the police arrested him. The police advised the
defendant of his Miranda rights and he invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel. At that
point, the defendant was placed in a police car with three officers who were ordered to trans-
port him to the police station. On the way to the station, one of the officers observed that
there was a school for handicapped children in the vicinity and expressed concern that one of
the children might find the shotgun and hurt herself. As a result of this statement, the de-
fendant indicated that he would direct the officers to the weapon. The trial court sustained
the admissibility of the shotgun and testimony related to its discovery and the defendant was
subsequently convicted of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court and ruled that although the defendant had been in "custody" when he was in the police
car, the police had not subjected him to "interrogation" for purposes of Miranda. Id
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in custodial interrogation, the Court applied it in such a manner that
findings of subtle interrogation in future cases are unlikely.
77
The Court's decision in Edwards continues the trends outlined
above. Although the majority opinion provides additional safeguards to
an individual who has invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel, the
Court diluted those safeguards with exceptions and qualifications. The
police may subject an individual to custodial interrogation if that indi-
vidual initiates contact with the authorities.7 8 Moreover, the police may
initiate contact with a suspect so long as their words and actions fall
short of a very narrow definition of "interrogation.17
9
In their concurring opinions, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Pow-
ell dispute the "special" or "new per se" rule implied by the majority's
emphasis on "initiation." 80 Indeed, the Court's decision appears to re-
quire a preliminary analysis as to who initiated contact between a sus-
pect and the police. Although this reading of the case seems inconsistent
with previous Burger Court rejections of per se exclusionary rules, the
exceptions and qualifications noted above sharply limit this "special" or
"new per se" rule. In addition, the need to extend additional protec-
tions to an individual who has invoked his fifth amendment right to
counsel explains much of the deviation from the Burger Court trend.
The Supreme Court decision in Edwards v. Arizona goes further than
any previous Burger Court ruling to protect an individual from the po-
tential for compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation. Nevertheless,
the decision does not go far enough. Given Miranda's language and ra-
tionale, the Court should have announced in Edwards an unqualified per
se rule against a valid waiver of the fifth amendment right to counsel
once an individual has invoked that right.
The majority opinion in Edwards provides that an individual who
has invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel may subsequently
waive that right if he initiates contact with the authorities.8 1 This em-
77 In rminr, the police officer attempted to elicit an incriminating response from the de-
fendant. Although it is possible that the officer's attempt might have failed, it does not seem
that the defendant's response or any other incriminating response was unlikely. This position
is supported by the fact that the officer's words and actions brought about the desired result.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, asserted that the
majority's reasoning "verg[ed] on the ludicrous." 446 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens termed the holding "remarkable. . . [and]
clearly wrong. . . as a matter of law." Id at 314 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Grossman and
Lane argue that "it seems reasonable to assume that if a majority of the Court was unwilling
to find 'interrogation' in Innis, it is unlikely that they will ever find it." Grossman & Lane,
sufpra note 14, at 267.
78 See note 13 & accompanying text supra.
79 e note 12 & accompanying text supra.
80 101 S. Ct. at 1886 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Id at 1887 (Powell, J., concurring).
81 Set notes 34-40 & accompanying text sup ra.
1981] 1301
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
phasis on "initiation" is unfounded. That a suspect initiated contact
with the police may reveal something about the voluntariness of a subse-
quent confession, but the initiation of contact is irrelevant to the ques-
tion of whether a waiver of the right to counsel has been knowing and
intelligent. There is no rational basis for the majority's selection of sus-
pect initiated contact as the point at which the authorities may disre-
gard an individual's "undisputed right" to be free from custodial
interrogation.
Permitting custodial interrogation once a suspect initiates contact
with the police will increase the potential for compulsion which Miranda
sought to dispel, as well as the incentive for police misconduct. Al-
though the Miranda decision was primarily concerned with the potential
for compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation, the Court also recog-
nized the coerciveness of custody alone.8 2 Under the majority opinion
in Edwards, the coerciveness of custody may compel an individual to
initiate contact with the authorities and forfeit his absolute protection
from custodial interrogation. Authorities desiring to interrogate an indi-
vidual who has been taken into custody and seeking to avoid the auto-
matic exclusion of any statements subsequently obtained might simply
ignore the individual until his concern about his status and the coercive-
ness of custody compel him to "initiate" contact with the police. Al-
though the courts should not protect an individual suspected of a crime
from all of the pressures of the criminal process,8 3 these pressures should
not undermine the constitutional safeguards authorized by the fifth
amendment.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Miranda v. Arizona in order
to develop "concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agen-
cies and courts to follow."'8 4 In Edwards, the Court abandoned this con-
cern and introduced a qualified standard of waiver that is certain to
leave the police and the lower courts without guidance. The majority
opinion provided that an individual forfeits his "undisputed right" to be
free from custodial interrogation if he has initiated contact with the au-
thorities. Moreover, that the individual initiated contact with the au-
82 384 U.S. at 458. The Court emphasized the importance of preventing "the compulsion
inherent in custodial surroundings" from undermining an individual's free choice.
83 Miranda was not designed to protect individuals from all of the pressures of the criminal
process. The potential for compulsion is inherent in any encounter with the authorities, but
only gains constitutional significance after a certain point. The Court in Miranda established
"custodial interrogation" as the point at which the potential for compulsion endangers the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The majority opinion in Edwards per-
mits the potential for compulsion inherent in custody alone to indirectly endanger the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination by undermining the effectiveness of the Mi-
randa warnings.
84 See note 15 supra.
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thorities is a "necessary fact" in determining whether a valid waiver of
the right to counsel preceded any subsequent custodial interrogation.
As a result, the outcome of any given case may depend upon an inter-
pretation of "initiation"85 or upon the amount of weight given to the
"necessary fact" that a suspect initiated contact with the police. 86 The
possibility that the police and the lower courts may use ambiguous con-
cepts such as these to procure and validate confessions of doubtful con-
stitutionality directly conflicts with the purpose of Miranda.
The implications of an invocation of the fifth amendment right to
counsel require an unqualified per se rule against a valid waiver of that
right prior to the appointment of an attorney. When an individual as-
serts his fifth amendment right to remain silent, he indicates that he will
make his own decisions regarding his conversations with the authorities.
When an individual asserts his fifth amendment right to counsel, how-
ever, he expresses his inability to act in his own best interests. 87 A pre-
sumption of incompetence arises which the initiation of contact in no
way rebuts. There is no reason to assume that an incompetent individ-
ual has gained the ability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of a
constitutional right simply because he has initiated contact with the au-
thorities. Only the appointment of counsel adequately protects an indi-
vidual's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.88
85 For example, the police might notify a suspect that he should contact them if he has
any questions about his status. Although a suspect might subsequently initiate contact with
the police as a result of this notice, this should not result in a forfeiture of his absolute protec-
tion from custodial interrogation. The Court does not indicate the extent to which the con-
cept of initiation must be applied literally.
86 For example, one suspect might initiate contact with the police to volunteer a state-
ment while another suspect might initiate contact with the police to complain about condi-
tions. These two cases are very different in terms of their tendency to reveal a willingness or
an ability to waive the fifth amendment right to counsel. The Court does not indicate, how-
ever, the difference in weight, if any, that each "necessary fact" should be given in determin-
ing whether there has been a valid waiver of counsel. The wide range of circumstances that
might bring about suspect-initiated contact suggests the complexity of the problem.
87 See, e.g., Comment, The Right to Counselin Police Interrogation Cases: Miranda and Willians,
12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 112, 139-40, 142-43 (1978); Note, Constitutional Law-Criminal Proce-
dure-Cutodial Suspect6 Admissions Aer Assertion and Subsequent Waiver of Right to Counsel Are Not
Per Se Excluded in Absence of Coercion, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1075 (1978). There are, of
course, situations in which the invocation of the right to counsel is spontaneous and reveals
nothing about an individual's competence to act in his own best interests. Nevertheless, any
attempt to detect these situations would undermine the effectiveness of the Miranda protec-
tions. Unless an individual's initial invocation of the fifth amendment right to counsel is
equivocal, he should not be subjected to subsequent custodial interrogation to determine
whether he still desires to be represented by an attorney. Further questioning would increase
the potential for compulsion by diminishing an individual's confidence in his ability to limit
police conduct.
88 In Miranda, the Court emphasized that "the presence of counsel :.. would be the
adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to
the dictates of [the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination]." 384 U.S. at 466.
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An unqualified per se rule against a valid waiver of the fifth
amendment right to counsel once that right has been invoked would
avoid the problems outlined above. First, it would eliminate the possi-
bility that the coerciveness of custody might compel an individual to
forfeit his absolute protection from custodial interrogation. Second, it
would eliminate the incentive that authorities might otherwise have to
keep an individual uninformed as to his status. An unqualified per se
rule would require that any statements obtained as a result of custodial
interrogation be excluded at trial, regardless of who initiated contact
between an individual and the authorities.89 Moreover, an unqualified
per se rule would provide the police and the lower courts with "concrete
constitutional guidelines" by establishing the appointment of an attor-
ney as the point at which the authorities may subject an individual who
has invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel to custodial interroga-
tion. This approach is unambiguous and is consistent with Miranda's
recognition of the importance of counsel in offsetting the potential for
compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation. 90
An unqualified per se rule against a valid waiver of the fifth
amendment right to counsel once that right has been invoked is desira-
ble despite the criticisms that are often directed at per se exclusionary
rules. In general, two arguments are made.91 First, a per se rule is by
definition inflexible and may result in the exclusion of properly admissi-
ble statements. Second, a per se rule may deprive an individual of the
opportunity to exercise independent judgment by committing him to an
initial decision.
The constitutional safeguards outlined in Miranda were designed to
prevent the admission of involuntary statements rather than to insure
that no voluntary statements were excluded. 92 The exclusion of a few
properly admissible statements is necessary to protect the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. An unqualified per se rule
against a valid waiver of the fifth amendment right to counsel once that
right has been invoked would not prohibit custodial interrogation indef-
initely. It would merely postpone it until the appointment of an attor-
ney. The need to protect the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and the guidance which per se rules provide for the police
89 An unqualified per se rule would not, however, prevent an individual from volunteer-
ing an incriminating statement. See note 36 supra.
90 See note 88 sufira.
91 The Arizona Supreme Court used these two arguments to support its rejection of an
unqualified per se rule. 122 Ariz. at 211, 594 P.2d at 77. See Note, FjfhAmendment, Confessirn,
Sef-Incrimination--Does a Request for Counsel Prohibit a Subsequent Waiver of Miranda Aior to the
Presence of Counsel?, 23 WAYNE L. REv. 1321, 1336-37 (1977).
92 See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 113 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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and the lower courts outweigh any potential harm to efficient law
enforcement.
Once an individual has invoked his fifth amendment right to coun-
sel, an unqualified per se rule against a valid waiver of that right prior
to the appointment of an attorney in no way restricts the exercise of.
independent judgment. The invocation of the right to counsel itself is
an act of independent judgment. If an individual thereafter decides
that he would rather act on his own behalf, he may do so after the ap-
pointment of counsel. If it is argued that an attorney will prevent an
individual from exercising independent judgment, it is better that the
individual be coerced by someone who is obligated to act in the individ-
ual's best interest than by someone who is determined to implicate him
in a crime.
V. CONCLUSION
A majority of the members of the Supreme Court of the United
States evidently believe that the decision in Miranda v. Arzona is un-
sound.93 Nevertheless, those justices have chosen to undermine the
foundation of the controversial decision rather than to overrule it.
94
The Burger Court's assault on Miranda continues with Edwards v. Ali-
zona. Although the decision diverges slightly from earlier Burger Court
rulings by establishing a limited per se exclusionary rule, the exception
to that rule will certainly limit the impact of the decision on future
cases.
The majority opinion in Edwards fails to protect the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. The decision increases the po-
tential for compulsion which Miranda sought to dispel by ignoring the
coerciveness of custody. It also encourages police misconduct by provid-
ing an incentive to bring about suspect-initiated contact. Moreover, the
decision is based upon ambiguous concepts that leave the police and the
lower courts without guidance.
An unqualified per se rule against a valid waiver of the fifth
amendment right to counsel once that right has been invoked would
avoid the problems outlined above. First, it would require that any
statements obtained as a result of custodial interrogation be excluded at
trial, regardless of who initiated contact between an individual and the
authorities. Second, it would provide the police and the lower courts
with "concrete constitutional guidelines" by establishing the appoint-
93 Only Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall have consistently voted in support of the
principles outlined in Miranda.
94 In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, the Court rejected an appeal made by 22 states
that the Court use the decision to overrule Miranda. The Court decided the case on sixth
amendment grounds.
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ment of an attorney as the point at which, the authorities may subject an
individual to custodial interrogation. Moreover, an unqualified per se
rule is responsive to the implications of an individual's decision to be
represented by an attorney. When an individual asserts his fifth amend-
ment right to counsel, he expresses his inability to act in his own best
interests. An attorney is required to explain the potential disadvantages
of self-representation and the legal significance of any actions that might
be taken. Only then can an individual make a knowing and intelligent
waiver of constitutional rights. Once an individual has invoked his fifth
amendment right to counsel, the appointment of an attorney is required
to protect the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
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